1. Most Russians really do support Putin:
The latest numbers on Putin’s popularity did not come from some Kremlin entity, which might, to put it delicately, have a conflict of interest.
Rather, they came from the Levada Center, an independent and respected polling agency whose leadership has a contentious history with the government. The pollsters at Levada have no incentive to fabricate Putin’s approval ratings to bolster the public image of the Kremlin.
While it is true that in authoritarian societies, even independent polls can overstate the leader’s popularity due to citizens not wanting to dissent from the political climate, conformity can only account for so much.
The magnitude of Putin’s popularity means that even with this factor taken into account, he still would have the support of the overwhelming majority.
2. The Ukraine crisis provided a significant boost:
In January 2014, shortly before the start of the crisis, Vladimir Putin had a 65% approval rating. Since then, his approval rating has skyrocketed to a stunning 89%, even as Russia’s economy is facing sanctions related difficulties.
This is an all time high for him, with his previously highest approval rating being 88% in 2008, shortly after victory in the Russo-Georgian War.
3. Putin’s personal popularity doesn’t translate into support for the way Russia is ruled:
Comparing the support most Russians express for Vladimir Putin with their views about the Russian government as a whole, reveals a stark contrast.
Russians are not over eager to spend quality time with government employees, with 69% of them trying to have minimal interaction with the government.
Nor do Russians posses strong faith in the legal system, with 47% claiming not to feel protected by the law while only 41% saying they did.
These numbers illustrate not only a lack of support, but an absence of trust for the Russian political system outside of Putin.
4. Sanctions may actually be helping Putin:
Some analysts have argued that once sanctions hurt the average citizens, Russians would lose enthusiasm for Putin’s actions in Ukraine, and perhaps even protest like they did in 2011 and 2012, forcing Putin to chose between backing down on Ukraine or facing a potential revolution at home.
But this has not occurred. From September 2014 to June 2015, Russians who claimed to be “very seriously” or “somewhat seriously” affected by sanctions rose from 16% to 33%, whilst the number of people who claimed to have suffered no negative side effects from sanctions fell from 35% to 13%.
During this same time period, Putin’s popularity continued to grow. With 66% of Russians believing that Western sanctions are meant to “weaken and humiliate” Russia, many have rallied around the flag and embraced Putin as a “father protector” defending the country against foreign onslaught.
Instead of blaming Putin for their economic woes, many Russians blame the West. Nearly half of all Russians say that sanctions are intended not only to cripple elite circles, but also to punish ordinary Russians. Many thus regard sanctions as assaults on them and their families, in addition to being an attack on their country.
While it is conceivable that this could change in the face of greater economic hardships, it would be reckless to assume that it will. If it does not, then Putin may find himself under pressure from the Russian public not to appear surrendering to the West, making it more difficult for him to make concessions.
5. On Ukraine, even some in the opposition support Putin: