Because of the September 11 terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed four Americans, Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA are reportedly developing “perhaps a dozen or more” target packages consisting of terrorist encampments and individuals suspected of being involved. A senior U.S. official said that “highly pre-decisional…options are being teed up,” should President Obama request them (he reportedly has not), though the official warned, “[I] don’t think that a final list of who was involved is solid.” Given that U.S. surveillance drones were flying over Libya well before the Benghazi attack and have been conducting a “stepped-up, more focused search” for perpetrators since then, it is certain that America’s spies and special operators will find targets — perhaps as few as ten individuals — against which Obama can authorize an attack.
As is true with any terrorist attack against American citizens, military bases, or diplomatic sites, Obama faces tremendous pressure to “do something” in response, especially as Republicans cite the president’s supposedly weak foreign policy as a cause of the attacks. While the president vowed that “we will not waver in our commitment to see that justice is done,” it is highly unlikely that justice will involve capturing suspects, interrogating them, and trying them in U.S. courts. Instead, given Obama’s unprecedented reliance on using lethal force against terrorist suspects, rather than placing U.S. soldiers at risk to capture them, the suspected Benghazi perpetrators will find themselves in the crosshairs of drone-launched Hellfire missiles.
If Obama authorizes an attack, he should be aware that counterterrorist strikes in retaliation for specific terrorist plots or operations have rarely deterred the targeted group from attacking again. The theory that military retaliation leads to either specific deterrence (in which a targeted adversary is warned against undertaking a specific behavior) or general deterrence (in which a standing threat is broadcast to potential adversaries to convince them not to undertake certain behaviors) is one countless policymakers are continually asserting. To quote just one famous example, President Bill Clinton told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, “It would scare the shit out of al Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters in the middle of their camp. It would get us enormous deterrence and show those guys we’re not afraid.”
Despite this widely held belief, there is little evidence that force deters terrorism./blockquote
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/09/dont_just_do_somethingmilitary intervention, by its nature, means collateral damage, anyone who has read Kilkullen Accidental Guerrila will also know that without COIN counterinsurgency can counterintuitevely, mean killing terrorists will create more (terrorists in close knit tribal societies like pushtan, marsh arabs, etc mean if you kill one, then it can radicalise other members family, or tribe), torturing and rendering islamists (or taxi drivers in the wrong place at the wrong time in Afghanistan) creates more terrorists
using drones in Benghazi wont fix the lack of security in Libya, using NFZ in Syria means SEAD which will destroy the Syrian Armed forces and with AQI expanding expoentially (recent Iraqi estimates are that it has doubled in size last year 1k to 2k) that is due to US turning a blind eye to KSA spreading wahhabism and Qatar trying to become the new regional power; using AJ to promote Muslim Brotherhood (or MB hoarding media access across ME); all as a quid pro quo, KSA act as swing producer to mean no more OPEC oil crisis (the credit crunch and euro crisis are enough thanks) and buy $40bn arms (the Saudis used to buy from the UK, atl mentions al Yammarah, which had Prince Banadar and $1bn bribe, Ian Black doesnt include that Bandar alledgely threatened Blair withdraw KSA intelligence which would risk another 7/7; that the Swiss confirmed the $1bn, that US Justice went after BAE on seperate Nigerian deal and fined, and that the BAE – EAD would have created a to large to fail company, but UK has its golden share and would have blocked, as UK taxpayers, we have subsidised BAE for over a decade for billions (£7bn on two aircraftless carriers, £5bn for scrapped Nimrod, £100m+ for Tranche 1 Typhoon that could drop bombs to combat non-existant Warsaw Pact, and now £30bn for Trident, so we can retain US ‘special relationship’ and the all important veto and UNSC seat, but heck, £30bn cheap, its not like we have to cut social spending £16bn by 2016, which means half police, 80k Army)